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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4398 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 TEDDY YOUNG, a/k/a T. Turan Young 
 
 Teddy Young,  
                        Appellant  
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:05-cr-00056-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: VANASKIE, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: 9 January 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Teddy Young challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion to vacate 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We granted a certificate of appealability on 
Young’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during failed plea 
negotiations.  At the Government’s urging, the District Court denied this claim without 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal, however, the Government concedes this was 
improper.  We agree.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order insofar as it 
denied this claim and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  
 In February 2005, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted 
Young and 18 others on a variety of drug trafficking-related offenses, including 
conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin.  The Government 
subsequently made a written plea offer to Young, which included stipulations regarding 
the calculation of his advisory range of imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Pertinent to this appeal, the proposed agreement included a three-level reduction of 
Young’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of 
responsibility.  Had Young accepted this deal and the District Court ultimately adopted 
the agreement’s stipulations, he would have faced a Guidelines range of approximately 
27 to 34 years’ imprisonment.  
 Young, however, rejected the plea deal and was convicted following a jury trial.  
Without the benefit of the plea agreement’s three-level reduction under § 3E1.1, Young’s 
minimum Guidelines sentence increased from 27 years to life imprisonment.  The District 
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Court imposed this new minimum, and we affirmed Young’s conviction and life sentence 
on direct appeal.  See United States v. Lee, 339 F. App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Young thereafter filed a motion in the District Court to vacate his sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Among the host of constitutional challenges raised in his 
motion, Young argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea 
negotiations.  Specifically, Young claimed that his counsel failed to advise him of the 
dramatic increase in the minimum Guidelines sentence—from 27 years to life 
imprisonment—he would face if he proceeded to trial instead of accepting the plea.  
Young also claimed his counsel did not advise him of the high likelihood of conviction or 
recommend that he accept the plea deal. 
 The Government urged the District Court to reject this ineffective assistance claim 
without first holding an evidentiary hearing.  In support of this position, the Government 
noted that Young’s statements at sentencing demonstrated that counsel had informed him 
of the Government’s plea offer, but Young nonetheless rejected the deal because he 
found its terms to be unacceptable.  The District Court agreed, denied Young’s 
ineffective assistance claim and the other claims raised in his § 2255 motion, and 
declined to issue a certificate of appealability. 
 Young then sought a certificate of appealability from this Court, which we granted 
on the single issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Young of 
his comparative sentence exposure prior to rejecting the Government’s plea offer.   
II.  
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  In assessing a district court’s consideration of a § 
2255 motion, we exercise plenary review of the court’s legal conclusions, apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to its factual findings, and review its denial of an evidentiary hearing 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Bui, 769 F.3d 831, 834 (3d Cir. 2014). 
III.  
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, Young must show that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  In the plea context, we have noted that “counsel 
is required to give a defendant enough information to make a reasonably informed 
decision whether to accept a plea offer.”  Bui, 769 F.3d at 835 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  We have also “identified potential sentencing exposure as an 
important factor in the decisionmaking process, stating that ‘[k]knowledge of the 
comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will 
often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
At the Government’s behest, the District Court rejected Young’s ineffective 
assistance claim without holding an evidentiary hearing.  To support this approach, the 
Government initially directed the District Court’s attention to statements by Young at 
sentencing demonstrating that he was aware of the plea deal but unhappy with its terms. 
Now, however, the Government concedes that these statements do not establish whether 
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Young “was fully advised regarding all the pertinent circumstances” relating to the plea 
deal.  (Appellee’s Br. at 14.)  Accordingly, the Government requests that we remand the 
matter to the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Young’s ineffective 
assistance claim and reconsider its initial decision.   
We agree this is the proper course of action.1 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order entered on 
October 25, 2013, to the extent it denied Young’s claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance during plea negotiations, and remand for further proceedings. 
                                              
1 Young requests that we either fashion a remedy to “restore [him] to the position 
he would have occupied had his attorney been effective,” or appoint a new judge to 
preside over the proceedings on remand “to avoid the appearance of impropriety.”  
(Appellant’s Br. at 13.)  The first approach is inappropriate because we have not reached 
the merits of Young’s ineffective assistance claim.  We also reject Young’s alternative 
request to recuse the presiding district judge on remand, as “[w]e have repeatedly stated 
that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal . . 
. .”  Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted). 
 
